While the stated intention — improving global pandemic response — is laudable, these changes raise profound legal, ethical, and democratic concerns. Concerns have been raised about the potential for the treaty to give too much power to the WHO or to disproportionately impact democratic processes during a pandemic. These concerns focus on the possibility of countries being effectively “forced” to implement measures that could limit civil liberties or infringe on national sovereignty without adequate democratic oversight. They risk eroding constitutional rights and entrenching unelected global actors with powers that could affect every citizen’s life and liberty.
COVID-19 exposed flaws in global health coordination. Disjointed national responses, delayed data sharing, and uneven vaccine distribution prompted the WHO to seek a more unified approach to addressing pandemics. In theory, the revised IHR and the new Pandemic Agreement aim to:
But – and it is a big but – beneath these surface goals lies a deeper concern: the undue transfer of power from democratically accountable national governments to an unelected international bureaucracy.
The WHO is based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its employees enjoy diplomatic immunity, receive untaxed salaries, and their appointment is not subject to public elections or direct public accountability. Under the new amendments, the WHO Director-General gains the authority to declare a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” (PHEIC) or a “Pandemic Emergency” — even if the state concerned disagrees.
Such a declaration enables the WHO to make a range of recommendations that member states will arguably be expected to adopt, including:
Though labelled as “non-binding,” these recommendations carry political and economic weight, particularly for developing countries that rely on WHO funding, medical resources, and diplomatic standing.
Imagine a novel virus emerges in a remote region. Within days, WHO experts declare it a potential global threat. The Director-General issues a PHEIC declaration, prompting a cascade of recommendations:
This scenario was once the domain of speculative fiction. The new IHR framework now makes it a real possibility. Nations that hesitate to comply may face pressure in the form of international backlash, funding cuts, and diplomatic isolation.
One of the most concerning features of the new WHO framework is its expanded role in managing the so-called “infodemic” — the spread of information deemed false or misleading during health crises. While well-intentioned in aiming to curb dangerous rumours, this provision could open the door to widespread censorship.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Great Barrington Declaration, authored by leading epidemiologists from Harvard, Oxford, and Stanford, advocated for a targeted protection approach rather than universal lockdowns. Despite its scientific grounding, the declaration was quickly suppressed by media outlets and discredited through coordinated pressure from public health authorities.
In hindsight, many of its concerns have been validated, including the long-term harms of lockdowns on mental health, education, and economic stability. Under the WHO's new rules, similar dissenting views could be classified as misinformation, with governments pressured to suppress or penalise them, in turn stifling scientific debate, religious speech, and freedom of conscience.
Freedom of religion or belief (FORB) is especially vulnerable under such circumstances. During COVID-19, places of worship were among the first to be closed and the last to reopen. Bizarrely, authorities often imposed stricter limitations on religious gatherings than on casinos or shopping centres. Due to vaccine mandates, some persons of faith were forced to choose between violating their conscience or being excluded from education, employment, or healthcare access.
The WHO's new and updated instruments contain no explicit religious exemptions or conscience protections. There is only a vague reference in Article 3 of the IHR to respect for “dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms” — which lacks any binding effect. As a result, the new health regime could again see:
The revised IHR also permits the imposition of vaccine certificates or digital health passports, potentially restricting freedom of movement across and within national borders. Those who decline certain medical interventions on religious or personal grounds could find themselves excluded from work, school, or worship.
Such provisions raise major ethical red flags regarding bodily autonomy, a principle protected by Section 12 of the South African Constitution, which guarantees security in and control over one's body.
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the amendment of the IHR and the adoption of the new Pandemic Agreement is the lack of a participatory democratic process surrounding them. The “one-state-one-vote” formula is egalitarian between governments, but it is not directly democratic in the sense of representing world citizens. Common critiques of the WHO processes include limited civil society access, transparency gaps, compressed deadlines and executive-driven representation.
This underscores the importance of complying with the constitutional requirements and parliamentary rules for the domestication of the IHR amendments and Pandemic Agreement into South African law. First, Parliament must adopt both instruments. Then, Parliament must enact the IHR amendments and the Pandemic Agreement into law by national legislation.
If followed correctly, these procedures should ensure proper public consultation and parliamentary debate. This is of crucial importance because, to date, there has not been any such debate or consultation with civil society, including religious organisations and human rights defenders. This will prevent the South Africa from inadvertently ceding any decision-making power to an international agency or enacting international commitments that conflict with the Constitution.
No one disputes the importance of global cooperation in the face of health emergencies. But pandemic prevention, preparedness and response must never come at the expense of national sovereignty, democracy, and fundamental rights and freedoms. This is why the domestication of the IHR amendments and the Pandemic Agreement must be scrutinised carefully.
South Africa’s Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of religion, conscience, belief, expression, and bodily integrity. These rights must never be surrendered — not to Geneva, not to anyone.
The scars of the last pandemic are still fresh. Let us consider the IHR amendments and the Pandemic Agreement with composure while refraining from clouding our judgment with fear or surrendering to foreign pressure.
Freedom of Religion South Africa (FOR SA) is dedicated to protecting and preserving the freedoms and rights that the South African Constitution has granted to the faith community. If you have found this helpful, please consider supporting the work of FOR SA to protect our constitutional right to enjoy the freedom of religion by:
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FOR SA currently has a support base of religious leaders and individuals representing +/- 6 million people across a broad spectrum of churches, organisations, denominations and faith groups in South Africa.
FOR SA is not registered as a law firm and therefore cannot (and does not) give legal advice for which we can attract any legal liability; neither can we charge legal fees for our services.
